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Abstract 
Irrigation is a vital ingredient in the modern agriculture, groundwater
development through modern water extraction mechanisms (WEMs) have
therefore, been receiving greater emphasis in recent past. However, the
ownership of private WEMs is confined mostly to the large farmers. The
small and marginal farmers and even large farmers with fragmented holdings
are buyers of irrigation water from the neighbouring WEM-owners. This
has led to spontaneous emergence of groundwater markets. Although the
water markets benefit both buyers and sellers in one or the other way, they
have created certain implications in the utilization of this resource. The
present study has examined the structure, determinants and efficiency of
groundwater markets and has suggested policy options for the realization
of equitable benefits from this resource in Western Uttar Pradesh. It is
observed that a large proportion (82 %) of the farm holdings enter into one
or the other form of water market activities. The number of buyers decreases
as the farm-size increases, while the number of sellers increased with the
increase in the size of farm. The buying of groundwater is favoured by the
farmers with small size and fragmented holdings, low education attainment
and less probability of joint-ownership of a WEM. The possibility has
been shown of increasing the productivity in major crops like sugarcane
and wheat by reducing the excessive water-use on self-users farms, which
in turn would increase the availability of water on the buyers’ farms. The
study has identified various policy options which would lead to minimizing
the inequitable distribution of benefits and improving the efficiency of
water-use under the prevailing groundwater markets system. 
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Introduction
Reliable irrigation is the vital ingredient in the modern agriculture. Initially,
surface and groundwater irrigation through traditional water extraction
devices brought stability in the Indian agriculture, but they could not cope
fully with the demand of the modern agriculture. Therefore, policymakers
and farmers have started giving more emphasis to the development of
groundwater irrigation through modern water-extraction mechanisms
(WEMs). The ownership of private WEMs has, however, been confined
mostly to the large farmers (Dhawan,1982 and Shah, 1993). The small and
marginal farmers and even large farmers with fragmented holdings are to
enter into informal transaction for buying of irrigation water from the
neighbouring WEM owners. This has led to spontaneous emergence of
groundwater markets and their imaginative management offers major
opportunities for easy access to groundwater irrigation to resource-poor
small, marginal and even large farmers with fragmented holdings. The
evidences suggest that water markets have developed on a very large scale
in the recent years in South Asia, though in a localized manner (Lowdermilk
at. el, 1978; Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Singh, 1998; Singh and Singh, 2002; Sharma
and Sharma, 2004). The practice of selling groundwater appears to have
been prevalent in many parts of India even under traditional WEMs (Patel
and Patel, 1969; Moorti, 1970). Water markets benefit both buyers and
sellers in one way or the other and they have created certain efficiency,
equity and sustainability implications in the utilization of this resource. Earlier
literature has dealt with some major issues relating to the performance of
groundwater development and its impact on agricultural production, but has
failed to pinpoint the causal factors for inefficiencies in its utilization. The
present paper has examined the structure, determinants and efficiency of
groundwater markets, and has suggested policy options for realization of
maximum gains from the groundwater exploitation in Western Uttar Pradesh.
Methodology
For the present investigation, the Meerut district with a higher WEM
density was chosen purposively from Western Uttar Pradesh. The primary
data on different aspects of groundwater markets were collected from 180
randomly selected farmers from a cluster of four villages of two blocks.
The data pertained to the agricultural year 1994-95. The selected farmers
were classified as buyers, self-users+buyers, self-users+buyers+sellers, self-
users+sellers and self-users, based on their accessibility to different forms
of groundwater markets. Further, the selected farmers were classified into
three farm-size groups, viz. marginal (up to 1 hectare), small (1-2 hectares)Singh & Singh: Groundwater Markets in Western Uttar Pradesh 131
and others (greater than 2 hectares) in order to capture the variations among
the groups.
The buying and selling of groundwater being dichotomous dependent
variables, their determinants were assessed using the logit model. The model
postulated that Pi, the probability that ith farmer would buy groundwater
was a function of an index variable Zi, summarizing a set of the explanatory
variables. In fact, Zi was equal to the logarithm of the odds ratio, i.e., the
ratio of probability that a farmer would buy groundwater to the probability
that he would not buy groundwater and it could be estimated as a linear
function of explanatory variables (Xki). These could be mathematically
expressed as:  
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where,
Xki = The kth explanatory variable of the ith farmer
i  = 1, 2,..., N, where, N was the total number of farmers
k = 1, 2,..., M, where,  M was the total number of explanatory variables
a = A constant and
b  = An unknown parameter
In the logistic regression, the parameters of the model were estimated
using the maximum likelihood method. Since, the logistic regression model
is non-linear, an iterative algorithm was used for the parameter estimation. 
In the study, it was hypothesized that the probability of a farmer to buy
groundwater depends on the owned operational holding in hectares (X1),
the number of farm fragments (X2), source of energy (X3), percentage of
gross cropped area under sugarcane cultivation (X4), education in number
of years of schooling completed by the farm operator (X5), percentage of
family labour to the total family members (X6), percentage of non-farm
income to the total income (X7), joint ownership of a WEM as a binary
variable (X8) and groundwater selling price per hour through electric-operated
WEM (X9). The total value of farm-assets, cropping intensity and age of
the head of the family were also included in the analysis, but due to high
degree of correlation between farm-size and farm-assets, area under
sugarcane and cropping intensity, and educational level and age of the head
of the family, were subsequently dropped in the final model. The index132 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.19  January-June 2006
variable Zi indicating whether a farmer installed an electric-operated WEM
or not, was expressed as a linear function of the above listed variables as
Eq. (3):
Zi = a+ b1X1i + b2X2i + b3X3i + b4X4i +b 5X 5i + b6X6i + b7X7i + b8X8i +
b 9X 9i +Ui                   …(3)
To capture the impact of operational holding on the probability of buying
and selling of the groundwater, owned cultivated area were taken into
consideration. In this study, the a-priori expectation was that the probability
of buying and selling were inversely related to the size of farm.  Land
fragmentation was often suggested to be an impediment to WEM ownership.
With dispersed holdings, it was presumed to be more difficult to install a
WEM to irrigate all the land of the farmer than a consolidated parcel. It
was, therefore, expected a-priori that a farmer with high degree of
fragmentation was relatively less likely to own an electric-operated WEM
and buy water. Only electricity as a source of energy was assigned the
value of one, otherwise zero because it was a cheaper source of energy in
comparison to other sources. It might have a positive effect on buying of
groundwater as no rational farmer would substitute cheap availability of
groundwater to costly one. Sugarcane being a high water requiring and
high-value crop, occupies higher percentage of gross cropped area. A farmer
with high percentage of gross cropped area under sugarcane is relatively
more likely to install a WEM and not buy groundwater.
Since, education increased the ability of a farmer to interpret, understand
and modify new information, it was treated as a proxy variable for a farmer’s
managerial ability. In this study, years of formal schooling completed by the
head of the farm family were used as an index for the farmers’ managerial
skill. It was, therefore, hypothesized that the probability of buying of
groundwater was inversely related to the farmers’ education. The nature of
relationship between percentage of family labour to the total family and
buying of groundwater and its probability could not be established a-priori.
The non-farm income represented a rather stable component of family
income, it might provide adequate resource base to install a WEM for
improved agriculture. However, such a farmer might have less concentration
on farming and might not like to invest heavily in agriculture. Hence, the
nature of relationship between the percentage of non-farm income to the
total income and the probability buying of groundwater could not be
hypothesized on a-priori basis. Joint-ownership gave an opportunity to a
farmer to install a WEM more readily by mobilizing the financial and physical
resources to make the investment and utilize more of the WEM capacity to
irrigate more area per WEM. The impact of partnership on the likelihood ofSingh & Singh: Groundwater Markets in Western Uttar Pradesh 133
purchasing of groundwater could be captured by dummy variable for
partnership.  Therefore, it was hypothesized that joint-ownership was directly
related with the probability of selling of water and inversely related to the
buying of groundwater.  
The possible important factors contributing to the decision making on
buying and selling of groundwater were identified and the farmers’ perceptions
were also recorded. The large fragmentation of holdings, non-availability of
canal water in the canal command area, non-availability of a suitable joint-
partner to install a WEM, higher WEM density around their holdings,
accessibility to state-owned WEMs, part-time farming, non-availability of
institutional credit, non-subsidized interest rate of institutional credit, policy
of state electricity board to issue the connection, low water purchasing
price, high water-table, less non-farm income, cultivation of low-value crops,
high security cost of a WEM, and a symbol of social status were identified
as major contributing factors to determine the buying and selling of
groundwater.
The efficiency of water markets was examined with the help of resource
productivity analysis and decomposition of yields of sugarcane and wheat
crops and by comparing the cost of groundwater extraction and its selling
price. The Cobb-Douglas form of production function was found to be the
best fit in examining the resource productivity under different forms of water
market. The per hectare production function was specified as per Eq.(4):
Y = a X1
b 1X2
b 2 X3
b 3     …(4)
where,
Y = Output per hectare of crop in quintals,
X1 = Human labour used per hectare in mandays,
X2 = Number of irrigations applied, and
X3 = Fertilizer (plant nutrients) used per hectare in kilograms. 
The total change in yield was decomposed into water management
component that refers to better irrigation management under self-users’
form of water markets over buyers’ form of water markets and input
component that refers to changes in the quantities of independent variables.
Following Bisalaiah (1977), a decomposition model was developed to measure
the effects of both the components on changes in yields of sugarcane and
wheat crops.
Further, the efficiency of water markets was examined by comparing
the cost of extraction and selling price of groundwater. If the cost of extraction
was equal to the selling price, water markets could be considered as efficient.134 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.19  January-June 2006
Since, sources of energy constituted an important factor, which affected
the cost of water extraction and selling price, the efficiency of water markets
for electric- and diesel-operated WEMs was examined separately.  
Results and Discussions
Structure of Water Markets
It was observed that, of the total farm holdings, buyers constituted the
largest segment (26 %), followed by self-users+buyers+sellers (23 %), self-
users+sellers (19 %), self-users (18 %) and self-users+buyers (14 %) (Table
1). In other words, a large proportion (82 %) of the farm holdings was
entering into one or the other form of water market activities. The size-wise
analysis showed that the number of buyers decreased as the farm-size
increased, while reverse was the case in water sellers. The average size of
holdings was found to be lowest (1.30 ha) for buyers only with an average
number of 2.4 farm fragments per holding.  As far as the accessibility to
different WEMs was concerned, on an average 66 per cent of the farmers
and 78 per cent of the area had accessibility to the electric-operated WEMs
(Table 2). It was also noted that only two per cent farmers had accessibility
to diesel-operated WEMs with an average of 14 per cent accessibility to
their irrigated land. This was mainly due to the fact that a substantial parcel
of land had total dependency on this mode of WEMs. On the other hand, 32
Table 1. Structure of water markets 
Particulars Buyers Self-users Self- Self- Self- Total




Marginal 19(53) 4(11) 3(8) 5(14) 5(14) 36(100)
Small 20(27) 13(18) 16(22) 13(18) 11(15) 73(100)
Others 7(10) 9(13) 22(31) 17(24) 16(22) 71(100)
Total 46 (26) 26(14) 41(23) 35(19) 32(18) 180(100)
Irrigated area (ha)
Marginal 13.8(52) 2.6(10) 1.92(7) 4.4(16) 4.0(15) 26.7(100)
Small 26.9(26) 18.3(18) 23.8(23) 19.3(18) 16.0(15) 104.4(100)
Others 18.4(7) 34.1(14) 83.4(33) 58.4(23) 59.7(23) 254.1(100)
Total 59.2(16) 55.1(14) 109.1(28) 82.1(21) 79.7(21) 385.2(100)
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per cent farmers had access to the electric+diesel-operated WEMs but
irrigating only 8 per cent of their total land. The buyers’ category had
proportionately higher accessibility to diversified WEMs than that of self-
users category, mainly due to their fragmented nature of holdings.
Determinants of Groundwater Markets
Determinants of Buying of Groundwater
The important variables selected and maximum likelihood estimates of
the coefficients of logistic regression analysis are reported in Table 3. The
model fitted very well to the data as indicated by the larger observed
significance of log likelihood ratio test, and chi-square test, which was
significant at one per cent level. The model provided 79 per cent correct
prediction of the dependent variable.  The results clearly indicated that the
total operational area, number of fragments per farm, years of schooling of
head of the family and joint-ownership of a WEM were significant factors
which affected the water buying decision of farmers. Sign and magnitude
of the coefficients were according to prior expectations. The size of
operational holdings, years of schooling and joint-ownership of a WEM had
negative sign, indicating that the buying of groundwater would be favoured
by the small-sized farmers with low education and low probability of joint-
ownership to install a WEM. Number of fragments per farm had a positive
significant effect on water buying. It is obvious that with more dispersed
holdings, farmers would not be able to install many WEMs to irrigate their
fragmented land but would prefer to purchase water. High percentage of
gross cropped area under sugarcane, family worker to the total family
Table 2. Farmers’ accessibility to WEMs across the water markets
Water markets       Percentage of the total farmers access to
Electric WEMs Diesel WEMs Electric+Diesel
WEMs
Buyers 65(76) 0(12) 35(12)
Self-users +buyers 62(80) 0(14) 38(6)
Self-users+ buyers+sellers 51(71) 0(18) 49(11)
Self-users +sellers 72(77) 11(19) 17(4)
Self-users 84(86) 0(6) 16(8)
Total 66(78) 2(14) 32(8)
Note: Figures within the parentheses are percentages of cultivated area having
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members and non-farm income to the total income, and higher water price
though showed negative effect on buying of groundwater in the study area,
they were non-significant.
The results of farmers’ perception about the buying of groundwater are
presented in Table 4. Nearly half of the respondents were buying water due
to larger fragmentation of their holdings. Nearly 40 per cent of the small
and marginal and two-thirds of others category of farmers reported to buy
the groundwater due to larger farm fragmentations. Non-availability of canal
water in its tail-end area was identified as another important factor reported
as their first choice by 15 per cent of the respondents. Lack of suitable joint
partnership to install a WEM appeared to be another important factor which
was considered by 12 per cent of the respondents as their first choice to
buy water. Higher WEM density around their holdings was preferred by 8
per cent respondents which varied from 3 per cent for others to 12 per cent
for the marginal farmers. The smaller size of operational holdings was
considered by the marginal (15 %) and small (8 %) farmers as their first
choice to buy groundwater. Only a few farmers chose accessibility to state
owned WEM, part-time farming, non-availability of institutional credit, non-
subsidized interest rate of institutional credit, policy of state electricity board
of not issuing electricity connections to the farmers having power requirement
Table 3. Logistic regression coefficients of factors affecting groundwater buying
Factors Coefficient t-value Mean
Intercept 1.7904 1.1226 1.00
Total operational area (hectares) -0.5046* -3.3861 2.15
Number of fragments per farm 1.0995* 4.8437 2.41
Cheap source of energy (electricity) 0.5018 0.8453 0.66
Percentage of gross cropped area -0.0227 -1.2688 50.88
  under sugarcane
Number of years of schooling -0.0910** -2.2304 5.63
Percentage of family worker to family size -0.0058 -0.2851 33.29
Percentage of non-farm income to total income -0.0112 -1.0969 21.95
Joint-ownership of WEM -1.4625* -3.6869 0.47
Groundwater price per hour (electric WEM) -0.0132 -0.0917 6.89
Minus 2 log likelihood 180.97
Chi-square 56.67*
Correct prediction (%) 78.89
Number of observations 180
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less than 7.5 HP and low water charges for water buying. The other factors
such as level of water-table, non-farm income, cultivation of low-value crops
and high security cost of WEM were found to be non-influencing variables
as not a single farmer responded to these factors.
Determinants of Selling of Groundwater
The logit model predicted the groundwater selling decision of the farmers
with 71 per cent accuracy (Table 5). Large observed significance level of
log likelihood ratio test and one per cent significance level of chi-square
indicated that model fitted very well to the data. The size of owned
operational holdings, number of farm fragments, installed electric horse power
(HP) per unit of land and joint-ownership of WEM were the significant
factors which affected selling decision of the farmers. The farmers with
larger size of operational holding were in a position to install a WEM with an
intention to hire out excess water for the additional earnings. This was
possible as most of the small and marginal farmers did not have financial
capabilities to install their own WEM to irrigate their crops. The probability
of selling water showed a direct relationship with farm fragmentation. It
could be explained that as the fragmentation of holdings decreased, the
capacity utilization of a WEM and selling increased. Higher horse power
(HP) per unit of cultivated land had increased the probability of selling water
as expected. Joint-ownership gave an opportunity to install a WEM, therefore
it also increased the probability of selling of water.
Table 4. Buyers’ perception about the buying of groundwater 
Factors                                               Percentage of respondents
         as their first choice
Marginal Small Others All
Respondent (number) 26 49 38 113
Larger farm-fragmentation 42 39 68 49
Non-availability of canal water 12 20 11 15
Non-availability of a suitable partner 15 11 13 12
Higher WEM density 12 10 3 8
Small size of holding 15 8 0 7
Access to state WEM 0 4 3 3
Part-time farmer 4 2 0 2
Non-availability of institutional credit 0 2 0 1
Non-subsidized interest rate 0 2 0 1
Low water price 0 2 0 1138 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.19  January-June 2006
Efficiency of Groundwater Markets
Productivity and Farm Income
 The perusal of Table 6 revealed that the realization of crop productivity
and farm income varied widely across the water markets. The yields of
sugarcane and wheat crops were found to be highest on the owners’ category
farms and lowest on the buyers’ farms. The differences in costs and returns
Table 6. Farm returns and yield of major crops across the water markets
Particulars Buyers Self- + Self- Self- Self-
users users+ users+ users
buyers buyers+ sellers
sellers
Cost of cultivation (Rs/ha) 34658 38551 36281 39768 39723
Gross income (Rs/ha) 37253 42598 40643 44516 43865
Net income (Rs/ha) 2295 4047 4362 4748 4142
Wheat yield (t/ha) 3.83 3.96 4.10 4.19 4.15
Sugarcane yield (t/ha) 48.70 55.20 54.60 58.60 57.60
Table 5. Logistic regression coefficients of factors affecting groundwater selling
Factors Coefficient t-value Mean
Intercept -3.7824** -2.1939 1.00
Owned operational area (ha) 0.3026** 2.0671 2.12
Number of fragments per farm 0.4150** 2.2663 2.41
Cheap source of energy (electricity) -0.1553 -0.2648 0.66
Percentage of gross cropped area 0.0321 1.5872 50.88
   under sugarcane
Number of years of schooling -0.0205 -0.5365 5.63
Percentage of family worker to family size 0.0045 0.2201 33.29
Percentage of non-farm income to total income -0.0043 -0.3820 21.95
Joint-ownership of WEM 1.2373* 3.1835 0.47
Groundwater price per hour (electric WEM) -0.2320 -1.5601 6.89
Installed horse power per hectare (electricity) 0.6276* 4.4577 1.79
Minus 2 log likelihood 184.61
Chi-square 60.55*
Correct Prediction (%) 71.11
Number of observations 180
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were more pronounced in sugarcane than wheat. Although, the self-users
categories of farmers incurred relatively higher costs on cultivation of all
crops, they realized higher returns than that of buyers’ category. This was
partially due to proportionately more land devoted for high-value crops by
the WEM owners and partially due to better accessibility and reliability of
groundwater irrigation.
Resource-use Efficiency
Among different forms of production function, the Cobb-Douglas
production function, which gave the best fit, was selected. The coefficient
of irrigation was found to be positive and significant for buyers only, suggesting
that an increased use of irrigation would further increase the productivity of
sugarcane on this type of farms. The irrigation coefficient, however, was
negative and significant for self-users’ farms, indicating overutilization of
this resource (Table 7).  In the case of wheat, irrigation was found to be
positively significant on buyers’ farms and non-significant on other categories
of farms (Table 8). This suggested the possibility of increasing the productivity
of sugarcane and wheat by reducing the excessive water-use on self-users’
farms, which in turn would increase the availability of water on buyers’
farms.
Table 7. Production elasticities of factors influencing sugarcane productivity 
Variables Buyers Self- + Self- Self- Self-
users users+ users+ users
buyers buyers+ sellers
sellers
Constant 2.3194 3.2334* 2.4322** 2.3953* 1.7645
(1.5230) (1.1088) (0.9566) (0.8107) (1.4306)
Human labour 0.7081** 0.5920* 0.8207* 0.7436* 1.3996*
(0.2923) (0.1959) (0.2025) (0.1349) (0.2844)
Irrigation 0.4946* 0.2639 -0.0576 -0.0770 -0.8565*
(0.1709) (0.2103) (0.0803) (0.1152) (0.1958)
Fertilizers (NPK) -0.1338 -0.09748 -0.0450 0.0593 -0.1428
(0.1442) (0.1370) (0.0758) (0.0800) (0.1881)
R2 0.34 0.38 0.32 0.55 0.58
No. of observations 45 26 41 35 31
Note: Figures within the parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 9.  Determinants of change in productivity among different forms of water
market 
Particulars                     Sugarcane                         Wheat
Self-users Self-users + Self-users Self-users +
vs sellers vs vs sellers vs
buyers buyers buyers buyers
Total change in 15.93 18.01 6.85 7.10
productivity (actual)
Total change in 13.11 18.33 6.47 6.99
productivity (estimated)
Sources of changes
Change due to irrigation 22.62 15.0 4.29 6.15
management
Total change due to inputs -9.51 3.32 2.18 0.84
I. Human labour 7.69 4.48 0.11 0.47
II. Irrigation -15.43 -1.55 0.93 1.15
III. Fertilizers -1.78 0.39 1.14 -0.78
Table 8.  Production elasticities of factors influencing wheat productivity
Variables Buyers Self- + Self- Self- Self-
users users+ users+ users
buyers buyers+ sellers
sellers
Constant 1.4478** 2.0053** 2.3219* 1.0248* 2.6787*
(0.7716) (0.9117) (0.7607) (0.7891) (0.7995)
Human labour 0.1892 0.3681 0.1065 0.0589 0.0289
(0.1670) (0.2322) (0.1165) (0.0975) (0.1401)
Irrigation 0.4848* 0.0948 0.0581 0.1044 0.0774
(0.1670) (0.2481) (0.1590) (0.1546) (0.2245)
Fertilizers (NPK) 0.1562** 0.0278 0.2020** -0.0974 0.1893**
(0.0803) (0.1288) (0.1174) (0.1305) (0.1026)
R2 0.27 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.18
No. of observations 46 26 41 35 32
Note: Figures within the parentheses are standard errors.
           *and **  indicate significance at 1 and 5 per cent levels, respectively.  
Decomposition of Productivity 
Irrigation facilities under different forms of water markets had influenced
the use of inputs in crop production and timeliness of farm operations. ItSingh & Singh: Groundwater Markets in Western Uttar Pradesh 141





(i) Depreciation 1.47(11.70) 5.29(11.84)
(ii) Interest 4.42(35.16) 15.86(35.50)
(iii)Total fixed cost 5.89(46.86) 21.15(47.34)
Operating cost
(i) Electricity/Diesel charges 3.63(28.88) 16.75(37.49)
(ii) Maintenance cost 2.67(21.24) 5.45(12.20)
(iii) Interest 0.38(3.02) 1.33(2.97)
(iv)Total operating cost 6.68(53.14) 23.53(52.66)
Total cost of water extraction 12.57(100) 44.68(100)
Average selling price 6.89 29.53
Note:  Figures within the parentheses indicate percentage to the total cost.
caused structural change in production process and created a new production
function. As a result of these factors, farmers were getting substantially
higher yields under owners’ category of WEMs than the buyers of irrigation
water.  The decomposition analysis provided the mechanism for decomposing
the total difference in yields among different forms of water markets in
their constituent. It was evident that water management accounted for higher
yields of 15 to 23 per cent of sugarcane and 4 to 6 per cent of wheat on the
farms under self-users and self-users+sellers categories as compared to
that of purely buyers of irrigation water (Table 9). This implied that the
same level of input-use would produce 15-23 per cent more output per unit
of land for sugarcane and 4-6 per cent for wheat on self-users category of
farms through better management of irrigation.  Intensive use of irrigation
water per unit of land under the self-users’ category resulted in a declining
productivity of sugarcane by 15 per cent over purely buyers. The situation
in the case of wheat crop was a bit different. The increase in productivity
due to intensive use of human labour, irrigation water and fertilizer use per
unit of land under self-users’ category had been 2 per cent over that of
purely buyers. The analysis, thus, clearly indicated that there was a close
association between the change in actual productivity and ownership of
WEMs in both the crops. The role of irrigation management was more
prominent in sugarcane crop than wheat crop, as sugarcane happened to be
an annual crop and its water requirement was much higher, particularly
during the summer season than that of wheat crop grown in winter.142 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.19  January-June 2006
Cost of Water Extraction and Selling Price
The total cost of water extraction of electric- and diesel-operated WEMs
were worked out to be Rs 12.57 and Rs 44.68 per hour, respectively (Table
10). Of the total, the share of fixed and operating costs accounted for about
47 and 53 per cent for these WEMs, respectively. The interest on fixed
capital constituted the highest share (35 %) in the total cost of water
extraction, followed by the share of electricity tariff (29 %) in electric-
operated WEMs. On the other hand, fuel cost constituted the highest share
(37 %) in the total cost of water extraction in diesel-operated WEMs. The
average selling prices of groundwater extracted through electric- and diesel-
operated WEMs were Rs 6.89 and Rs 29.53 per hour, respectively. Since,
selling prices were lower than cost of water extraction, it implied that water
markets were not efficient in the pure market theory sense, and water
buyers were in a better position in comparison to the WEM owners. Although
the water selling was not economically a viable proposition, it provided
rationality to the WEMs owner to recover a part of the expenditure incurred
on electricity/ diesel charges, maintaining wear and tear through the sale of
surplus water. Thus, both owners of the WEMs and buyers of the
groundwater were benefited in one way or the other by the water markets.
Conclusions and Policy Options 
The area under study has been found dominated by small and fragmented
farm holdings. More than four-fifths of the total sample farmers have entered
into one or the other form of water market activities. The number of buyers
have inverse relationship with the farm-size, while reverse has been the
case in water sellers. The electric-operated WEMs dominate the
groundwater irrigation. The buyers have accessibility to both the electric as
well as the diesel-operated WEMs. The buying of groundwater is favoured
by the farmers of small-sized holdings with low educational attainment and
less probability of joint-ownership of a WEM. Higher the number of
fragments, more has been the level of water buying. On the other hand,
source of energy, sugarcane acreage, size of family, family workers and
water prices have been found to be non-significant factors in influencing
the water-buying decisions of the farmers. The significant factors determining
the groundwater-selling decisions of farmers have been the size of owned
operational holdings, number of farm fragments, possibility of joint-ownership
of WEMs and horse power per unit of land.
The costs and returns structure has been found more in favour of owners’
category than buyers’ category. The resource productivity analysis has
illustrated the possibility of increasing the productivity of sugarcane andSingh & Singh: Groundwater Markets in Western Uttar Pradesh 143
wheat by reducing the excessive use of water on the owners’ category of
farms, which in turn would increase the availability of water on buyers’
farms. The decomposition analysis has revealed a close association between
increased productivity and better irrigation management due to ownership
of the WEMs.   None of the water-extraction mechanisms has been found
to be efficient in the existing water market system as the selling price is
markedly lower than the average cost of water extraction.  However, the
selling price is more than the operating cost of water extraction in both
types of WEMs. Thus, both owners of the WEMs and buyers of the
groundwater are benefited in one way or the other by the working of water
markets. In order to achieve better distributive social justice and encourage
efficient water markets, suitable water price policy needs to be evolved.
Similarly, the erratic electricity supply compels the farmers to install more
than optimum number of WEMs, thereby making them to bear high fixed
cost per unit of water extraction.  This has called for rationalization of the
electric distribution system. The study has also identified policy options such
as consolidation of landholdings and joint-ownership of WEMs for the
realization of equitable benefits from groundwater irrigation.
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